Information Security

Cyberattack on the Port of Santos: what happened and what companies can learn.

A cyberattack took down the administrative systems of the Santos Port Authority in Brazil, while ships and cargo kept moving. Here is what we know so far and the business continuity lessons that apply to companies of any size.

By Vandeilson SouzaNovember 13, 202611 min read
Cyberattack on the Port of Santos: what happened and what companies can learn

Last week, the Port of Santos, the largest port in Latin America, made headlines for a reason that has nothing to do with cargo records. A cyberattack hit the administrative systems of the Santos Port Authority (APS), the state-owned company that manages the port. Request and management systems, the intranet and the institutional website went offline, Brazil's Federal Police opened an investigation, and data recovery is still under way.

At the same time, according to the APS, ships kept arriving and departing, cargo kept moving and land access kept working. That contrast is what makes the case so instructive: it shows, almost in real time, what separates a serious incident from a shutdown.

In this post, we gather what is known so far, based on information released by the APS and the Brazilian press, along with practical business continuity lessons that apply to companies of any size and sector.

What happened

The timeline below was put together from reports published between November 10 and 13, 2026.

  • Friday, November 6: a power outage takes down the APS servers. Administrative systems come back in the evening, then fail again. According to Gazeta do Povo, the APS has two data centers: when the first one stopped, the second took over the load, but it also went down.
  • Saturday, November 7, around 3 a.m.: the team identifies a virus on the network. According to the APS's internal investigation, the malicious code was already installed before the power outage and was triggered when the servers were restarted. It is still unknown when or how it got in.
  • In the following days: a group claiming responsibility for the attack contacts the APS by email, telling the company to reach out to recover its data. The APS did not reply. According to the port authority's president, Anderson Pomini, the contact never got to the point of making demands, and no payment was made.
  • Monday, November 9: internet, email and telephone services are restored.
  • Tuesday, November 10: the APS publicly confirms it suffered a cyberattack and says it has activated its contingency plan. The Federal Police opens an investigation.
  • Thursday, November 12: the technology team reports having recovered about 70% of the backup copies of the affected files.
  • Friday, November 13: the APS website comes back online overnight. Other systems are still being restored.

During the week, the state commission responsible for public security at ports (Cesportos) also raised the protection of port access to level 2, on a scale of 3, with tighter entry controls and more inspections.

What stopped and what kept working

According to the APS and press reports, the following were affected:

  • The request intake system.
  • The internal document workflow system and the administrative management tool.
  • The institutional website, the intranet and online customer service.
  • Servers holding information on ships, customers, berthing requests and payments. The APS does not yet know whether the attackers accessed this data.

The following kept working:

  • Ship arrivals and departures, cargo handling and land access.
  • Porto Sem Papel ("Paperless Port"), a federal government system that connects shipping agents to agencies such as the Federal Revenue Service, the Federal Police, the Navy and the health regulator Anvisa. It was not affected and, together with mobile phones and email, became the channel for exchanging documents and authorizing vessels.
  • Terminal operations. Companies interviewed by the press reported, at most, occasional slowdowns.

This does not mean the incident was minor. Administrative processes slowed down, ship clearance came to depend on emails and full recovery is not yet complete. But the core of the operation kept running.

What we still do not know

  • How and when the virus got into the network.
  • Whether data was accessed, copied or leaked. At the time of publication, the APS had not confirmed any of these scenarios.
  • Who is behind the attack. The case has the hallmarks of ransomware, the type of attack in which criminals lock or encrypt data and demand payment to release it, but this has not been officially confirmed.
  • The size of the losses. No estimate of financial losses has been released.

The information in this post reflects what had been released as of November 13, 2026. The investigation is being led by the Federal Police, and new facts may change part of this picture.

Lessons for companies of any size

You do not need to run a port to be exposed to the same kind of risk. Hospitals, notary offices, city governments, schools and service companies all depend on administrative systems that, when they stop, freeze customer service, billing and communication. Without judging the decisions made in Santos, which remain under investigation, the case illustrates six business continuity principles well.

1. The attacker may already be inside

Perhaps the most important detail of the case is this: according to the APS, the malicious code was already on the network before the power outage. Attacks of this kind usually have a silent phase, in which the attacker gets in, explores the environment and prepares the ground before acting. The earlier this presence is detected, the smaller the damage.

  • Monitor servers and workstations with endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools and centralize activity logs, so you can spot unusual behavior before it becomes a crisis.
  • Review access accounts frequently, especially administrative and vendor accounts.
  • Keep everything up to date. Known, unpatched flaws are still among the most common ways in. In November, for the second month in a row, Microsoft fixed more than a thousand flaws in a single release, and CISA, the US cybersecurity agency, warned of active attacks against a flaw in WordPress core. In October, we wrote here on the blog about PHP2Shell, the critical PHP flaws, which began to be exploited within hours.

2. A backup only counts if restoring it has been tested

Recovering about 70% of the backup copies shows that backups existed, and that makes all the difference. Without copies, the only way out would be to negotiate with criminals, with no guarantee at all. At the same time, the case shows that restoring entire environments takes days, even when the copies are available.

  • Follow the 3-2-1 rule: three copies of the data, on two different types of media, with one of them outside the main environment. At least one copy should be offline or immutable, out of reach of anyone who breaks into the network.
  • Test restores regularly and measure how long it actually takes to bring each system back online.
  • Define, for each system, how long it can be down and how much data the company can afford to lose. These are the metrics known as RTO (Recovery Time Objective) and RPO (Recovery Point Objective), and they guide how much to invest in backup and redundancy.
  • Decide the recovery order in advance. In Santos, communication (internet, email and telephone) came back first, a choice that makes sense: without communication, nothing else can be coordinated.

3. Redundancy must be independent

According to Gazeta do Povo, when the first data center went down, the second took over the load and also stopped. The causes have not yet been clarified, but the episode is a reminder of an important principle: redundant environments that share the same power supply, the same network or the same access credentials can fail together.

  • Keep the contingency environment separate from the main one, whether on your own servers or in the cloud: a different location, a different power supply, a different network.
  • Use different administrative credentials in each environment, so that one stolen password does not open both doors.
  • Run failover tests that simulate the loss of the main environment, not just tests of normal operation.

4. Separate what is critical from what is administrative

The most positive point of the case is that port operations continued. This is only possible when the systems that support the core activity do not depend on administrative systems, and when there are alternatives outside the affected environment, such as Porto Sem Papel.

  • Map the critical business processes and the systems each one depends on.
  • Segment the network, isolating critical systems from administrative systems and workstations.
  • Document alternative procedures (forms, contact channels, external systems) and train teams to use them. A contingency plan that only exists on paper, or that is stored on the very server that went down, does not help in a crisis.

We went through a similar exercise in 2025, during the global Cloudflare outage: having contingency protocols defined before the problem is what kept our services running.

5. Do not negotiate in the dark, and call the authorities

The APS did not reply to the criminals and the case is with the Federal Police. Paying a ransom does not guarantee you will get your data back, as CERT.br, Brazil's national computer emergency response team, warns, and it funds further attacks.

  • Report the incident to the police. Government bodies can also rely on their national incident response centers, such as CTIR Gov in Brazil.
  • Preserve evidence (activity logs, affected machines) before reinstalling everything. It is essential to understand what happened and keep it from happening again.
  • Have the contacts of incident response specialists, legal counsel and your insurer, if you have one, defined before the crisis.

6. Communicate transparently, including to the data protection authority

In the first hours of an incident, it is common for the diagnosis to be unclear. In Santos, the outage was first associated with a power failure, and the attack was confirmed later, as the investigation progressed. That is why it pays to have a communication plan ready, so you can quickly share what is known and what is still being investigated.

  • Prepare template messages for customers, partners, the press and internal teams.
  • Define who speaks for the company and through which channels, including channels that work even if corporate email is down.
  • Know your legal obligations. In Brazil, under the LGPD (the Brazilian General Data Protection Law), when an incident may pose a relevant risk or harm to data subjects, the controller must notify the ANPD, the national data protection authority, and the data subjects within three business days of learning that personal data was affected, under ANPD Resolution No. 15/2024. Small-scale processing agents have twice that time.
  • Record the incident internally, even when notification is not required. The same resolution requires this record to be kept for at least five years.

Questions to take to your next board meeting

If what happened in Santos happened at your company tomorrow, the answers to these questions would make a difference:

  • Do we know which systems are critical and how long each one can be down?
  • Do we have at least one offline or immutable backup copy? When was the last full restore test?
  • Would our contingency environment go down along with the main one?
  • Can operations continue for a few days using alternative procedures?
  • Who decides and who communicates during an incident? Can these people be reached outside the company's systems?
  • Do we know how, and how quickly, to notify the data protection authority?

Preparation makes the difference

No organization is immune to a cyberattack. What changes the outcome is preparation: detecting early, having backups that actually work, separating what is critical and knowing exactly what to do when something goes wrong. The Port of Santos case shows both sides of this equation, with important systems offline and, at the same time, an operation that did not stop.

To go further, also read our posts on web platform security best practices and secure hosting on AWS.

If your company wants to review its continuity plan, its backup strategy or the security of its systems, get in touch.

Sources

Tags

#cyberattack#ransomware#Port of Santos#business continuity#contingency plan#backup#LGPD

About the Author

Vandeilson Souza

Vandeilson Souza

Operations Manager and Mid-level Business Analyst at Mupi Systems

Vandeilson Souza is Operations Manager and Mid-level Business Analyst at Mupi Systems, bridging clients, business areas and the development team since 2024. An IT technician from IFNMG currently studying Business Administration and Public Management, Vandeilson brings experience in process, KPI and customer service team management from AeC.

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